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KANTIAN AUTONOMY AND DIVINE COMMANDS
leffrie G. Murphy

J ames Rachels has argued that a morally autonomous person (in Kant's sense) could not
consistently accept the authority of divine commands. Against Rachels, this essay argues
Ca) that the Kantian concept of moral autonomy is to be analyzed in terms of an agent's
responsiveness to the best available moral reasons and (b) that it is simply question-begging
against divine command theory to assume that such commands could not count as the
best moral reasons available to an agent.

On a certain conception (often thought to be Kantian) of moral autonomy, it is
difficult to see how morally autonomous persons could accept any morally significant concept of authority-i.e., any concept of authority that goes beyond a
mere description of a power relation in order to provide at least prima facie
moral justifications for acts that would have been without justification in the
absence of the authority. A few years ago Robert Paul Wolff used a supposed
Kantian conception of moral autonomy to defend what he called philosophical
anarchism-the claim that the concept of moral autonomy and the concept of
legitimate political authority are inconsistent!; and, more recently, James Rachels
has argued that a morally autonomous person could not accept divine commands
as an authoritative source of moral obligation-and thus that the worship of God
is impossible for an autonomous person. 2 Rachels's argument proceeds in this
way:
(1) "To be a moral agent is to be an autonomous or self-directed

agent. ... The virtuous man is therefore identified with the man of integrity, i.e., the man who acts according to precepts which he can, on
reflection, conscientiously approve in his own heart."
(2) To accept divine commands as authoritative moral commands is to
accept the possibility that one may be morally required to perform some
action simply because it is required by God's commands even if the act
is not one that is according to precepts which one does, on reflection,
accept. 3
(3) Therefore: ''To deliver oneself over to [God or any other] moral
authority for directions about what to do is simply incompatible with
being a moral agent."
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There is, I think, considerably less to this argument than meets the eye. Indeed,
on one plausible interpretation of Kantian autonomy, it is straightforwardly
question-begging.
What is Kantian autonomy? Space limitations (and limitations on authorial
ability) do not allow for a full treatment of this question, but one part of the
answer should be obvious: Whatever else may be controversial about Kant's
ethics, one thing is not-namely, that the property about human beings which
gives them autonomy and confers upon them that special status that Kant calls
"dignity" is their rationality. There is, indeed, substantial equivalence for Kant
between the concepts of good will, rational will, and autonomous will.' Thus
both of the following concepts of autonomy should surely be rejected as Kantian
in either letter or spirit:
(a) An autonomous person is one who always does what he feels like
doing or wants to do or desires to do (in some ordinary sense of "feel
like", "want" or "desire"). 5 [So far indeed is this from Kant's conception
of autonomy that it is not a bad start toward an analysis of Kantian
heteronomy. ]
(b) An autonomous person is one who always does what he judges to
be the rational thing to do regardless of what his conception of rationality
is or how casually he applies that conception.
It is fairly obvious that (a) and (b) are indeed incompatible with the moral
authority of divine commands, for how could we ever logically guarantee that
God would never issue commands contrary to our wants or desires?--or to every
idiosyncratic and negligently applied standard of rationality that we might dream
up? It is also obvious, of course, that these incompatibilities are uninteresting
and unimportant because these concepts of autonomy are uninteresting and unimpOJiant (and surely unKantian). Suppose, then, we try another-and surely more
plausible-analysis of Kantian autonomy:

(c) An autonomous person always decides what he morally ought to do
based on the best set of morally relevant reasons available to him and
is motivated to act as a result of this decision.
This conception of autonomy is surely at least a part of what Kant had in mind
by the concept of autonomy. And thus, if it could be shown that an acceptance
of the moral authority of divine commands is indeed incompatible with autonomy
so understood, then one would have a potentially worrisome objection to divine
command moral theories. 1i But can this be shown? Not, I think, without a simple
begging of the question against divine command theories. For surely, at their
very essence, what all forms of the divine command theory maintain is that the
fact that some act is willed by God is the very best moral reason that could ever
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be available to an agent for judging an action to be right, because it is the very
thing about the act (the only thing about the act) that makes it right or obligatory.
Simply to say without argument that this could not count as a decisive or even
relevant moral reason is to beg the question against the whole account. Thus,
on what seems to be one plausible interpretation of Kantian autonomy, acceptance
of the authority of divine commands seems to be a consistent thing for a morally
autonomous person to do.
If this is all correct, however, one may well wonder why Kant himself was
such a committed opponent of divine command moral theories. 7 Kant, of course,
want~ my moral obligations to be "laws that I give unto myself," and it is indeed
hard to see how a law could be one that I give to myself if it is one that another
(even God) is imposing on me. But if Kant seriously means-as he surely
does--for such rational principles as non-contradiction and sufficient reason to
be constraints on autonomous willing,8 then he had better abandon at least some
of his weird talk about our being moral lawgivers to ourselves because such
rational constraints are surely not themselves self-generated. (If they were, they
would not be constraints.) Thus I do not think that we can get much mileage on
our issue simply be trotting out this venerable Kantian slogan.
Kant thinks, of course, that I am not acting autonomously if I act out of a
sensuous motive or inclination such as fear (even fear of God), and thus perhaps
it is a lurking suspicion that the motivation behind obedience to divine commands
must be the (non-moral) motive of fear that explains Kant's belief that such
theories are inevitably heteronomous. But, if this thought pattern is indeed at
work, then surely Kant can be challenged with respect to it in at least three
ways: (I) It is by no means obvious that the motive of fear is the only motive
that could drive a person who accepted the authority of divine commands. Perhaps
the motive of such a person might simply be that he in fact accepted the moral
authority of such commands-i.e., regarded the fact that an act had been commanded by God as the best moral reason that could be given in support of the
act's rightness. (2) It is by no means obvious what the phrase "the fear of God"
means (i.e., by no means obvious that it means something like "the fear of
Hitler") and thus we must be cautious of hasty classifications of the motive of
fear of God as either heteronomous or autonomous. 9 (3) Kant sometimes seems
to regard motives such a fear as heteronomous because they engage only our
phenomenal selves whereas truly autonomous motives (e.g., respect for moral
duty) engage our noumenal selves. But what does this mean? If Kant thinks that
my fear of some state of affairs (or any other desire or aversion directed to that
state of affairs) can never give me a reason for acting (but can only cause me
to act) he is surely mistaken. To give me a reason for acting (as opposed to
believing) just is to tie into my preference structure or scheme of desires in some
way. (How could I have a reason for doing something if it does not link up in
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any way with anything at all I care about?) Thus if I act heteronomously whenever
I act from my preferences, it seems that T always act heteronomously and that
autonomy is an illusion. (Kant has his reasons for denying this, but they grow
out of highly complex and controversial features of his metaphysical theory.
Surely we would not reject divine command theories simply because they conflict
with the most highly doubtful parts of the Kantian metaphysics.) Thus, if I
legitimately fear adverse reaction from God whenever I disobey his commands,
then Tsurely have a reason for obeying his commands; and thus I act autonomously
here at least in some minimal sense. It is not as though I were simply experiencing
twitches, spasms, reflexes, or engaging-in spite of myself-in compulsive
behavior.
But is my reason of the right sort? or a moral sort? Our natural inclination is
to think that "because he said so" or "because he will hurt you if you do not""
give us reasons for acting (at least in some contexts) but never reasons of a
moral sort. (We might-following H.L.A. Hart-say that such reasons give us
grounds for being obliged to do something but not for being obligated to do it. 1<')
Thus we have at most prudential reasons rather than moral reasons. But what
would moral reasons (and thus truly moral motivations) be? Not incursions from
the spooky noumenal world, surely, for all the reasons noted above. But then
what? Reasons that show that we really ought to perform the action independently
of any bearing it may have-in either the short or long run--{)n our interests or
preferences? But is is hard to understand what such reasons for acting could be,
and indeed there is a long tradition of philosophical argument-approximately
from Aristotle through Hobbes and Hume to Gilbert Harman and John Mackie llthat maintains that the whole idea of such a set of reasons is incoherent and that
any moral theory that requires it must be rejected. According to these theorists,
the distinction between morality and prudence-though useful to draw at certain
levels-ultimately breaks down, and with its breakdown comes various forms
of moral relativism." Thus if Kantian autonomy can only be understood in the
context of a kind of moral theory that there may be good reasons for regarding
as misguided or confused, we must not grow unduly suspicious of divine command theories if we discover that they do conflict with some forms of Kantian
autonomy. We must not reject a theory because it is incompatible with other
theories that, from the point of view of justification, may be in just as bad or
worse shape.
In short: On one reasonably plausible (and not unKantian) interpretation of
moral autonomy, there is no reason to think that divine command theories are
in conflict with it. They may connict with certain implausible or highly controversial accounts of moral autonomy, ones that fail to capture an interesting concept
of autonomy or that presuppose highly doubtful metaphysical claims, but it is
unclear how this could constitute a ground for rejecting divine command theories.
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There is a general moral in this: The rational justifications for and the metaphysical
presuppositions of all available secular moral theories are highly suspect, and
thus it is intellectually unfair to use them as sticks with which to beat divine
command theories or other forms of religious and theological morality. 13
Arizona State University
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